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THE FUTURE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: IS
IT TIME TO ABOLISH THE SYSTEM?*
Robert 0. Dawson**
I. INTRODUCTION
The juvenile justice system in the United States is approxi-
mately ninety years old. That age is old for a person and maybe also
for a social-legal institution. There are signs it may be time to begin
thinking about whether that system has served its purpose and
should be abolished.
Initially, it is necessary to define what I mean by the juvenile
justice system. I have in mind only that aspect of thejurisdiction of
a juvenile court that includes criminal conduct and certain non-
criminal conduct. Modern juvenile statutes normally label the for-
mer "delinquency" and the latter--often called status offenses-by
various names, such as "Persons (or Children, or Juveniles, or Mi-
nors) in Need of Supervision." Usually included in the latter are
running away from home, truancy, and (less often) incorrigibility or
ungovernability. I exclude from consideration other elements of the
possible jurisdiction of a juvenile court, such as adoption, termina-
tion of parental rights, child abuse and neglect, paternity, custody,
and support.
I include within my definition of the juvenile justice system not
only court proceedings but the entire legal process, beginning with
law enforcement, through court intake and detention, informal and
formal probation, and ending with the juvenile correctional process.
It is also necessary to state what I mean by abolition. I have in
mind abolishing the juvenile justice system as a system separate
from the criminal justice system. The result of abolition would be a
merger of the two systems or, perhaps more accurately, an acquisi-
tion of the juvenile justice system by the larger criminal justice sys-
tem. Abolition would not mean that all distinctions based on age
would be obliterated; there would still be differences in how the
Copyright 1990 by Robert 0. Dawson. All rights reserved.
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criminal justice system treats defendants based on their ages. There
would, for example, still be separation of youthful from older per-
sons in pretrial and post-trial detention, treatment, and correctional
facilities. The separations would not, however, be as rigid as they
now are.
II. WHY THE TIME MAY BE RIGHT TO CONSIDER THIS QUESTION
If one were to do an analysis over time of legal rights and legal
structure, comparing the juvenile justice to the criminal justice sys-
tem, with a view to determining the legal differences between the
two systems, the results would not be uniform. Were it possible to
conduct such an analysis with some precision, one would probably
find relatively little difference between the two systems initially, say
in the beginning of this century. Legal structures establishing juve-
nile justice as a separate system were just being established, but re-
sources were slower in coming. The system initially existed more in
name than in reality. It was not until about 1925 that virtually every
American state had enacted legislation establishing ajuvenile justice
system separate from the criminal system.' There was initially more
overlap in personnel operating the two systems. However, as the
treatment philosophy underlying the juvenile justice system gained
wider acceptance, the differences in legal rights and structure grew.
Those differences were probably greatest in the late 1950s and early
1960s when the driving legal philosophy of the juvenile justice sys-
tem was to entrust maximum discretion to the court and treatment
staff with the absolute minimum of legal control.
But, beginning in the early 1960s, voices of dissent from the
dominant legal philosophy grew.2 There was increasing skepticism
about the ability of the system to perform on its promises and in-
creasing concerns about whether the abuses of power that occurred
3
were really aberrations or whether they were the norm.
This criticism of the system culminated in famous opinions of
the United States Supreme Court in Kent v. United States4 in 1966 and
In re Gault5 in 1967. The immediate reaction to these decisions was
often to declare the juvenile system dead, but that pronouncement
proved premature. The system survived that round of constitu-
tional domestication, but did not remain unchanged. The major
I F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dix & R. PARNAS, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE PROCESs 6 (2d
ed. 1971).
2 See, e.g., Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 387 (1961).
3 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
4 383 U.S. 541 (1966). See text accompanying note 10.
5 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See text accompanying notes 14-17.
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legacy of Kent and Gault-and, later, In re Winship6-was the develop-
ment and enactment of modem juvenile justice statutes.
That legislation reflected a different philosophy from the origi-
nal statutes. The emphasis shifted from entrusting maximum power
and discretion to system officials to limiting and controlling those
powers. Room was made in the system for lawyers-as defenders,
prosecutors, and judges. And, with the presence of lawyers, the sys-
tem changed even more in the direction of a law-driven system and
away from a treatment-driven system. To that extent, the juvenile
system came increasingly to resemble the criminal system. The dif-
ferences had narrowed as a consequence of those landmark
Supreme Court decisions and the legislation they spawned.
Since the time of the "reform" legislation, there have been fur-
ther developments that have narrowed the differences. We have lost
even more of our faith in treatment and have replaced it with
shadows of the criminal system philosophies of individual responsi-
bility and punishment. We have increasingly embraced restitution,
community service, and even fines in the juvenile system 7 -concepts
that would have been anathema only a few years earlier. We have
become increasingly concerned with the violent juvenile offender
and have responded to that person by adopting even more of the
characteristics of the criminal system.8 In a few jurisdictions, we
have even replaced the traditional, broad dispositional discretion of
the juvenile court judge with a system of determinate sentences
much like those now in vogue in the criminal system.9
In summary, the legal differences between the juvenile and crimi-
nal systems are now narrower than they have been at any point in
our history since the juvenile system was created. We have, in a
sense, returned full cycle to the beginning. To be sure, both the
criminal and juvenile systems have undergone many changes in the
past ninety years; but looking only at the legal differences between
6 397 U.S 358 (1970). See text accompanying note 18.
7 See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JU-
VENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSITIONS 42-56 (1980).
8 For example, in 1987, Texas enacted a determinate sentence statute for violent
juvenile offenders that permits a lengthy sentence to be imposed by the juvenile court.
The first part of the sentence is served in the juvenile training school. At age 18, there is
a second juvenile court hearing to decide whether to release the respondent on juvenile
parole or to transfer him or her to the adult prison system for further service of sen-
tence. See Dawson, The Third Justice System: The New Juvenile-Criminal System of Determinate
Sentencingfor the Youthful Violent Offender in Texas, 19 ST. MARY'S LJ. 943 (1988).
9 The State of Washington has done so. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010
(1989).
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the two systems, we do appear now to be very close to the
beginning.
I have included an impressionistic chart of the differences in the
extent of departure of the legal rights and structure of the juvenile
system from the criminal over the past ninety years. Landmark
events are noted on the chart. Of course, the chart lacks quantita-
tive validity; it is instead intended merely to suggest visually the
magnitude of differences I have observed.
GRAPH 1
AGGREGATE DIFFERENCES IN LEGAL RIGHTS AND STRUCTURE
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One now encounters juvenile court judges who state (with dis-
gust) when an appellate court requires adherence to a rule of proce-
dure normally associated with the criminal system, "We might as
well give up and abolish the juvenile system." One also encounters
prosecutors and defense attorneys who articulate the same thought,
some with disgust and some with relish. To the juvenile justice tra-
ditionalist, the system seems to have changed far beyond any
recognition.
Taking a "legal snapshot" of the two systems at this time shows
differences that are more nominal than substantial. We apply simi-
lar rules for both arrests of adults and for taking children into cus-
tody and for custodial interrogation. Identical rules for searches
and pretrial identification apply. There is pervasive plea bargaining
in both systems, only we are more likely to acknowledge it openly in
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the criminal system than the juvenile. The government is required
to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt in both systems and
exclusionary rules apply with equal force. The guilt/innocence
phase of court proceedings are separated from the sentencing phase
in both systems, with the broad judicial discretion historically associ-
ated with the juvenile system now largely confined to the sentencing
phase, as has long been true in the criminal system.
A cynic would examine the legal structure of the juvenile justice
and criminal justice systems and conclude that one is an exact paral-
lel of the other. The cynic might add that the only difference is in
terminology and that such a difference exists only fraudulently to
mask the underlying sameness. Thus, adults are "arrested" but
juveniles are "taken into custody" even when the same law enforce-
ment officer exercises the power and takes the person to the same
police station. Adults are "booked" into custody, while juveniles
are "processed." Adults are "jailed" awaiting trial or release pend-
ing trial, while juveniles are "detained." Adults plead "guilty" or
''not guilty" to the "charge" in the "indictment" or "information,"
while juveniles plead "true" or "not true" to the "allegation" in the
"petition" or "complaint." Adults "plea bargain" most of their
cases, while juveniles "stipulate" most of theirs. Adults have "tri-
als" while juveniles have "adjudication hearings." Adults are found
"guilty" or "not guilty" while juveniles are found to be "within the
jurisdiction of the court" or "not within the jurisdiction of the
court." An adult case proceeds to "sentencing" if the "defendant"
is found guilty, while a juvenile case proceeds to "disposition" if the
"respondent" is adjudicated. While both can be placed on proba-
tion, an adult who does not receive probation is likely "sentenced"
to "prison" while a juvenile is "committed" to a "training school."
An adult in prison is an "inmate" while a juvenile in a training
school is a "resident" or a "student." An adult frequently is re-
leased from prison conditionally on "parole," while a juvenile often
is released from training school conditionally on "aftercare."
An adult who is found guilty of having committed a crime is a
"criminal"; a juvenile who is found to have committed the same
crime is a "delinquent" or simply "within the jurisdiction of the
court." The law specifically and in no uncertain terms declares that
the juvenile adjudication is not a conviction of crime and carries
none of the legal disabilities associated with such a conviction. In
certain circumstances, we find even the term "delinquent" too harsh
a judgment to place on the shoulders of a juvenile; instead, he or
she is called a "Person in Need of Supervision" or some such similar
euphemism. So ingrained is the difference in terminology, yet so
[Vol. 81
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self-consciously maintained, that when a judge or attorney is speak-
ing about a juvenile case and accidently says the child was "con-
victed," he or she is likely immediately to correct the error, with a
slight smile, by saying, "I mean adjudicated, or whatever you want
to call it."
If the only justification for maintaining a separate juvenile jus-
tice system were the advantages that accrue from a distinct legal
structure, a compelling case for abolition might be made. And, as
will be shown later, there are substantial advantages that could ac-
crue from "folding" the juvenile system back into the criminal. But
there are considerations, some of which have little to do with differ-
ent legal structures, that might give us pause in such an undertak-
ing. Here, we are going to look at the advantages and the
disadvantages of abolition. As in most such matters, conclusions
depend upon the balance that can be struck between the two.
III. THE CASE FOR ABOLrION
There are two major dusters of arguments for abolition, which
will be discussed in order: resource savings and eliminating fric-
tional costs.
A. RESOURCE SAVINGS
Initially, it is important to observe that the wall that separates
the systems is more complete in some jurisdictions than others, and
in some places in the same jurisdiction than in other places. This
fact has an important bearing on the resource savings that may be
expected from the proposed merger. In some states, the same ad-
ministrative structure, both line and staff, services both juvenile and
criminal courts. In most, however, there is either a different struc-
ture from top to bottom or parallel divisions of the same state-wide
department. In any event, in many jurisdictions there are adult pro-
bation officers and juvenile probation officers who are different peo-
ple and work out of different offices with different support staff. In
other jurisdictions, a probation officer's caseload may include some
juveniles and some adults.
Similar distinctions may be found in the judiciary. In rural ar-
eas, the only judge available will be both the juvenile and the crimi-
nal court judge (and would also hear probate, divorce, general civil,
and other types of cases). In urban areas, there are likely to be sepa-
rate judges for the juvenile and criminal courts. In any event, the
central point is that we already have in some parts of the country a
1990]
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substantial integration of resources between the systems. Abolition
would not save resources in those places.
However, in jurisdictions without resource integration, the sav-
ings could be substantial. Duplication of many staff positions and
functions could be eliminated-from computer systems to person-
nel officers to auditors to receptionists. Whether such duplication
would be eliminated is, of course, another question. Merger would
also permit more efficient use of courtroom space and personnel,
such as bailiffs and court reporters. It should be observed, however,
that in many localities such a savings would be difficult to achieve
because the juvenile courtroom is located in a juvenile or family jus-
tice center several miles from the courthouse.
It would be possible, with relative ease, to combine juvenile and
adult field probation officers and parole officers. Substantial savings
might result from such a merger, especially in the elimination of du-
plicated staff positions and functions. However, juvenile probation
officers perform many functions for which there are no counterparts
in adult probation work. Juvenile officers frequently serve as intake
and screening officers for the court system and also work directly
with juveniles in pretrial detention facilities.
Merger might make some resource savings possible in deten-
tion and correctional facilities. It would at least create some oppor-
tunities for greater flexibility, both in assigning inmates (residents)
to facilities and in transferring them from one facility to another.
An old juvenile facility might be converted into a minimum security
adult facility. One wing of an adult facility might be converted into
a facility for youthful offenders. Of course, there would emerge a
substantial turf battle between the county sheriff, who operates the
local adult detention facilities, and the (former) juvenile probation
department, which operates the local juvenile detention facility.
Probably, the sheriff would win and would take over the juvenile
detention facility.
In summary, the extent of resource savings resulting from
merger would vary widely from place to place. It would depend
upon the extent of pre-merger administrative integration, the con-
figuration of physical facilities, and the extent to which officials wish
to effect a resource savings or to maintain their own turfdoms after
merger. The savings could range from great to almost none at all.
B. FRICTIONAL COSTS
The juvenile justice and criminal justice systems are not totally
separate from each other. There are bridges over which cases can
[Vol. 81
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and do pass from one system to the other. However, the fact that
the systems are legally distinct makes those passages more difficult
and more costly than if the systems were merged together.
1. Eliminating Transfer Costs
Almost all juvenile systems have some mechanism for dealing
with the case or the respondent that is beyond the capability of the
system. Typical is the "Kent style"'10 transfer procedure. A case is
filed in juvenile court against a respondent in the upper juvenile
court age range. A prosecutor has discretion whether to handle that
case as an ordinary delinquency case or to seek transfer of the case
to criminal court for prosecution as an adult. Typically, a petition or
motion for transfer must be filed, social and psychological studies
conducted, and an extended, adversarial hearing held before the
question of whether to retain the respondent in the juvenile system
or to transfer him or her to the criminal system can be presented to
a juvenile court judge.
Although transfer hearings undoubtedly occur in substantially
fewer than one percent of the eligible cases that flow through the
juvenile courts, they occupy a disproportionate amount of the time
and energy of juvenile officials. Because transfer is extremely seri-
ous and the stakes are great for the respondent and society, the pro-
cess is protracted and the hearing extremely adversarial. A transfer
hearing is to the juvenile court what a capital murder case is to the
criminal court.
The result of a transfer decision is merely to place the case in
criminal court. It is not a trial. All of the trial and pretrial steps in
the criminal court remain yet to be taken. A merger of the systems
would totally eliminate the need for a transfer mechanism of any
kind. The resource savings could be substantial.
2. Avoiding Frictional Miscarriages
The separation of the juvenile justice from the criminal justice
system is ordinarily based on the age of the offender at the time the
offense is believed to have been committed. Thus, in many jurisdic-
tions, if the offense is committed a day before the actor's seven-
teenth (or eighteenth) birthday, he or she must be treated as a
juvenile and can be treated as an adult only if a transfer mechanism
is invoked successfully. However, if the offense is committed on or
after the seventeenth (or eighteenth) birthday, the case is a criminal
10 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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case from the very beginning and the juvenile court has no
involvement.
The difficulty with the system is that it assumes the appropriate
officials will know the actor's true age. It happens that sometimes
the arrested person will misrepresent his or her age in order to be
handled in one or the other of the systems. Also, it is not uncom-
mon for there to be official uncertainty about the age of the person
arrested because of the lack of reliable documentation. When this
occurs, it can cause substantial problems. In some systems, if the
ruse is carried out long enough, it can mean that the actor goes
free. I"
Certainly, merger of the systems would eliminate any problems
that occur because of the misrepresentation of the age of the ac-
cused or even official uncertainty as to age. While one cannot assert
that such events occur often, they do occur, and when they do, the
results are quite disruptive.
3. Providing for Continuity of Services
One of the abiding ironies of our handling of the chronic of-
fender is that, although upon each pass through the juvenile system
he or she is dealt with more harshly, upon becoming an adult, he or
she is given a fresh start. A hardened juvenile offender a few days
ago, he or she is now a first offender in adult court.
To some extent, this effect results from the confidentiality of
records in the juvenile system that impedes the easy flow of informa-
tion to criminal system officials. But, even when full information
about juvenile involvement has been disclosed, there is an undenia-
ble tendency on the part of criminal justice officials to discount that
information substantially in making adult dispositional decisions.
The person is treated as a first offender because he or she is a first
offender in the system that is making the decision.
The "fresh start" phenomenon reflects more than anything else
the attitudes of criminal justice officials toward the juvenile justice
system. They view themselves as the real legal control system and
the juvenile system as a "kiddie court" that only plays at legal con-
trol. This macho attitude ironically leads criminal justice officials to
adopt a fresh start approach when a juvenile violator graduates to
the criminal system.
That attitude is one reason why a surprising number of
11 See, e.g., Dawson, Responding to Misrepresentations, Nondisclosures and Incorrect Assump-
tions About the Age of the Accused: The Jurisdictional Boundary Between Juvenile and Criminal
Courts in Texas, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1117 (1987).
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juveniles transferred to adult court for prosecution end up on adult
probation supervision and why at least some persons ofjuvenile age
and with prior juvenile system experiences who are arrested without
identification misrepresent themselves as adults. A merger of the
two systems would probably eliminate this totally inappropriate no-
tion of a fresh start on crime when adult age is reached.
IV. THE CASE AGAINST ABOLITION
The case against abolition is based on the same reasons the sys-
tem was established in the first place. To a degree, then, it is an
examination of the extent to which those initial reasons still have
validity. The case against abolition is based on three clusters of ar-
guments: 1) the notion that minors have less responsibility for their
misconduct than do adults; 2) the greater rehabilitation potential of
minors, justifying greater devotion of resources; and 3) the avoid-
ance of inappropriate legal rules.
A. LESSENED RESPONSIBILITY
One reason for having a separate juvenile justice system is a
belief that it is inappropriate to hold children to the same standards
of responsibility as adults. Based on this same belief, the common
law recognized a defense of infancy to a charge of crime. The mat-
ter of where to draw a line between childhood and adulthood is sub-
ject to different views and is ultimately arbitrary, but most people
would agree that a line must be established and maintained. We
simply react differently to misconduct by a twelve year old than to
the same misconduct by a twenty year old.
We attach severe legal consequences to misconduct by the
twenty year old. We label it a crime and the offender a criminal. We
say that person has chosen to act badly. While we may recognize
social and other restrictions on his or her freedom to choose, we
believe that a choice was made and that one can be made by others
in similar circumstances. We attach severe legal consequences in
part to influence the choices others will make. We feel free to select
the worst of adult malfactors for punishment, sometimes quite se-
vere punishment. We save those we can and punish those we
cannot.
With children, we are more likely to look outside the actor to
understand the misbehavior. We are likely to look at parents,
school, neighborhood, and companions. We view the education
and development of the child as incomplete and, therefore, do not
hold him or her to adult standards of conduct. We find it much
1990]
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easier to forgive the misconduct of a child than an adult. After all,
the adult should know better.
So, for children we seek to avoid the imposition of the same
severe sanctions that we affirmatively desire to impose on adults.
We avoid the label "criminal" and its legal and social consequences.
We solemnly declare that the juvenile justice system, which looks
much like the criminal system, is civil in nature and that the child has
engaged in delinquency, not criminality. We carefully provide for
confidentiality of proceedings to protect the child. We protect court
and other records from public inspection and, often, destroy or seal
them once the process has expended itself and the child has been
"rehabilitated."
For children, we believe they will behave as they are labeled by
adults-that if we call the child bad, that is the way he or she will
view himself or herself and, consequently, behave in the future.
Therefore, we attempt to avoid labeling in the juvenile system be-
cause we fear that with impressionable children it will have the op-
posite effect we believe it to have with adults.
If the juvenile system were merged with the criminal, this phi-
losophy of lessened responsibility would, to some extent, have to
change. We would have to be willing to call the ten, eleven, and
twelve year old who commits a crime a criminal, even though in the
criminal system we might treat the child differently from the twenty
year old who engages in the same conduct. One might question
whether this is a step that we are prepared to take.
There is also the problem of status offenses, such as running
away, truancy, and incorrigibility. If we merge the juvenile system
into the criminal, we will lose this subsystem. That might be good
or bad, depending upon whether one believes the juvenile system to
have any business dealing with those problems-a matter of some
current controversy. The loss would be almost certain, however,
since it is doubtful that a state legislature would be willing to make it
a criminal offense for a child to run away from home, or to be truant
from school, or to disobey parents' orders. It is, of course, quite
another matter to make such condu& a subject of juvenile court ju-
risdiction, especially when we label it something less serious than
delinquency, such as "PINS"' 12 or "MINS." 1 The fact that we en-
gage in juvenile sublabeling is strong evidence that we would be
unwilling to handle such problems in the criminal system. After all,
12 "Person in Need of Supervision."
13 "Minor in Need of Supervision."
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if we are unwilling to call such conduct delinquent, would we be
willing to call it criminal?
To merge the juvenile back into the criminal system is inevita-
bly to abandon all or part of the notion of lessened responsibility of
children for their conduct. Childhood would, to be sure, still be
taken into account by prosecutors, judges, and juries in the criminal
system and would undoubtedly be a major mitigating factor in indi-
vidual cases. But the labeling would remain that of the adult and
many of the legal disabilities of that label would apply to children in
the criminal system.
How would the merged system work in those jurisdictions in
which judicial sentencing discretion in the criminal system has been
replaced by salient factor scores, offense severity scales, and matri-
ces of the two? It might be necessary to reexamine the applicability
of various determinate sentence schemes to youthful criminal of-
fenders, since those schemes are premised in part on notions of
adult responsibility. But that is a detail that could be worked out.
Perhaps a new scale of mitigation could be added to take account of
childhood.
B. GREATER REHABILITATION POTENTIAL OF CHILDREN
It is now fashionable to doubt the capability of the criminal sys-
tem to rehabilitate offenders. Too many recidivism studies have
been conducted with too many dismal results to permit many knowl-
edgeable observers to maintain the faith. To a lesser extent this ag-
nosticism has even crept into the juvenile system. We now think of
"managing" juvenile offenders,. rather than "rehabilitating" them.
Those who still believe in the rehabilitation of children are likely
now to place emphasis upon keeping the juvenile system from inter-
fering with the natural process of maturation into adulthood rather
than upon affirmative steps the system can take to rehabilitate an
offender: first do no harm, then cure if you can.
It was, of course, one of the prime beliefs of the early juvenile
system that children's behavior would respond to the intelligent ap-
plication of public resources-that we could cure delinquency with
the proper effort and with sufficient resources. To some extent, that
belief even penetrated the criminal system and spurred the develop-
ment of probation services, residential treatment facilities, and even
treatment programs within the fences of prisons. There are people
in both systems who still believe in rehabilitation, but there are pro-
portionally more of them in the juvenile System than in the criminal.
Why is that? Some are merely traditionalists who still hold the
1990]
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beliefs of the pre-1960s. Others acknowledge the obstacles to reha-
bilitation, but believe that if the juvenile system can shelter a child
from the destructive consequences (including legal ones) of his or
her conduct until he or she has passed through the difficult years of
adolescence, he or she may have a fighting chance of law-abiding
adulthood. For them, there are sufficient success stories to cancel
the depressing statistics. For them, the goal of the system is to keep
the government off the children's backs until they can mature. In
any event, many people believe that adolescence is a period of great
life change during which anything is possible, and that if public and
private resources are likely to be effective, it is during that period.
That belief likely accounts for the undeniable truth that chil-
dren attract resources. It is easy to be sentimental about children,
even those who misbehave in significant ways. They do, after all,
have less responsibility for their conduct than do adults. There is
always room for the belief that resources applied to children may
actually make a difference in adulthood.
Children attract public resources. That is why juvenile proba-
tion officers almost always have lower caseloads than their adult
counterparts. That is why juvenile institutions are smaller and com-
paratively better staffed than adult facilities. That is why there are
comparatively more public facilities for children than for adults. We
are simply willing to put our public monies on children more than
on adults.
But the big difference is in private resources. An integral part
of any juvenile justice system is a network of private, charitable, or
religious institutions, facilities, and programs. These can be used by
juvenile courts and their staff for placement or referral. These pri-
vate "correctional" resources are used by the juvenile system
thousands of time each year. There really is no adult counterpart to
this private segment of the juvenile system, at least not in anything
like comparable size.
What would happen to these public and private resources if the
juvenile system were merged with the criminal? Would they con-
tinue at their current levels, or would they recede because there is
no longer an easily identifiable beneficiary-the children of the city,
county, state, or nation? Of course, no one really knows what would
happen, but there is a risk that these public and, particularly, private
resources would gradually recede. Juvenile and adult caseloads on
probation, in institutions, and other facilities would gradually equal-
ize at closer to the adult level than the juvenile.
This would likely occur because it would be difficult to maintain
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that part of the clientele of the criminal system is ripe for rehabilita-
tion, while other parts are not. We would probably have more re-
sources for younger criminals than for older, but the difference
would not be as great as it now is. There would be a tendency to
blur our devotion to rehabilitation as a consequence of merger, just
as there would be a tendency to blur our concepts of responsibility
as a consequence of the same merger.
Perhaps these public and private resources could be better
spent elsewhere, perhaps not. In any event, one likely consequence
of merger would be a net decrease in the resources now devoted to
the two systems combined. But, new found efficiencies might cause
a net increase in the effectiveness with which those diminished re-
sources are used.
C. AVOIDING INAPPROPRIATE LEGAL RULES
The legal rules of procedure that govern the criminal and juve-
nile systems are virtually the same as a consequence of the due pro-
cess decisions by the United States Supreme Court and the round of
reform legislation that followed. There is a right to counsel and to
provision of counsel at public expense if the accused is unable to
afford counsel. 14 There is a privilege against self-incrimination in
each system, despite the juvenile system being nominally civil. 15
There is a right to confrontation and cross-examination of wit-
nesses.' 6 There is a right to notice of charges' 7 and to a require-
ment that the government prove its charges beyond a reasonable
doubt.18 There is also protection against twice being placed injeop-
ardy for the same offense.19 The fourth amendment, with its exclu-
sionary rule, applies in both systems, 20 as do the requirements of
Miranda.21
The only federal constitutional right adults charged with a crim-
inal offense enjoy that a juvenile charged with the same conduct
does not is the right to trial by jury. The Supreme Court halted the
due process revolution in juvenile justice at that point.22 A handful
of states provide for jury trials as a matter of state law, but most do
14 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34-42 (1967).
15 Id. at 42-57.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 31-34.
18 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
19 Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
20 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
21 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).




If the juvenile system were merged into the criminal, there
would be no denying children charged with criminal offenses the
right to trial by jury. That would be a healthy development in the
law-one the Supreme Court should have taken years ago when it
had the opportunity. In any event, it could potentially create a ma-
jor change in the way we do business in the juvenile system-a
change that many a juvenile justice traditionalist would contemplate
with horror.
But there is another change that might occur that would be
unqualifiedly catastrophic. Children in the criminal system would
have the right to bail. Bail is a peculiar constitutional right. It is
beneficial to the accused only if he has no other means of being
released from pretrial confinement. Otherwise, it is a burdensome
and corrupt system. In some communities, bailbondsmen control
who is released and who is not before trial; in many, they exert great
political influence over the local criminal justice system.
Increasingly, in the criminal system, bailbondsmen are being
replaced by public bail systems. A quick investigation is conducted
and if the accused shows ties to the community and, therefore, is
likely to appear for trial, he or she is released on his or her own
recognizance without the necessity of posting security or purchasing
a bail bond. In a variation on that practice, he or she may be re-
quired to deposit a percentage of the bond amount with the court.
Unlike a bail bond premium, however, this amount is returned to
the person posting it if the accused makes all of his or her court
appearances. Fortunately, in many communities, these public sys-
tems have totally displaced the traditional bailbondsman-but not
in all.
Where bailbondsmen exist, they are extraordinarily powerful.
They are likely to view adolescents as poor risks to appear for trial
and are likely to be less willing to post bond for them than for an
adult with a proven record of appearing for trial each time he or she
is arrested. There could be no denying the applicability of the bail
bond system that happens to exist in any community to juveniles
now charged in criminal cases.
Bail has been handled in the juvenile system by pretending that
it does not exist. The modern juvenile statute does not provide a
right to bail and does not deny the right to bail. It simply ignores
the subject entirely. Instead of providing by statute for a right to
23 See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO ADJUDICATION 51-56 (1980).
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bond in juvenile proceedings, modem statutes typically provide for
a promptjudicial detention hearing to be conducted under statutory
release criteria.2 4 While there are a few appellate opinions holding
that such a hearing is an adequate substitute for bail,25 the matter
has not been fully tested, for no one has the heart to risk opening
the doors of the juvenile justice center to the bailbondsman.
Yet, if the juvenile system were to be abolished, it would be
difficult not to treat adolescents charged with criminal offenses like
adults charged with the same offenses. Bail schedules would have to
apply to all. Because of the volume of cases, bond would be set
without much attention to the individual characteristics of the arres-
tee. In some communities fortunate enough to have release on re-
cognizance programs, many adolescent offenders would be
released. However, in those communities without such programs,
release would depend upon the willingness and financial ability of
the adolescent's family to post bond and upon the willingness of a
bailbondsman to write a bond.
Since most adolescents involved in the juvenile process are to-
tally dependent upon their families for money, whether they would
be released on bond would depend not upon their resources, but
upon those of parents and other relatives. Usually, that money
could be better spent elsewhere, and the parents appreciate that
fact. Further, they are very likely feeling quite hostile to their ar-
rested child at that moment and, even if resources are available, may
be unwilling to part with them for bail.
In summary, the bail bond system is a major problem in the
criminal justice system. It is a problem that has, by common con-
sent, been avoided in the juvenile justice system. Merging the two
systems would likely make bail bonds a problem in the juvenile sys-
tem for the first time. Bail bonds are, further, even less appropriate
in the juvenile system than in the criminal because children lack re-
sources of their own.
V. How WOULD LIFE BE DIFFERENT UNDER THE MERGED SYSTEM?
The answer to that question depends in part on how different it
is under the separate systems. The practical consequences of a
merger would be great or small depending upon the legal structures
and allocation of resources to the juvenile and criminal systems
prior to merger. Here, we shall take a case through the merged sys-
tem in an effort to detect differences. We shall assume that the now
24 See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 54.01 (Vernon 1987).
25 See, e.g., L.O.W. v. District Court, 623 P.2d 1253 (Colo. 1981).
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abolished juvenile system was fully implemented both legally and in
terms of resources. That will suggest a maximum model of differ-
ence as a consequence of merger.
Bill Bob, fifteen years of age, is taken into custody for a felony
offense-burglary.
Before merger, he would have been taken from the streets to a
special division of the police department, called the Youth Services
Division. He would have been processed, but probably not photo-
graphed or fingerprinted. His parents would have been contacted
by a Youth Services officer. That officer would have screened the
paperwork submitted by the arresting officer for factual and legal
sufficiency. It is possible that the officer might have questioned Bill
Bob in an attempt to clean up several recent unsolved burglaries. In
any event, if this were Bill Bob's first felony offense, and if his par-
ents were moderately concerned and stable, chances are that Bill
Bob would have been released by Youth Services from its custody to
that of the parents on the promise of the parents to bring him to
juvenile court when required. The paperwork generated by the tak-
ing of Bill Bob into custody would probably have remained at a local
law enforcement level, not sent to a central state or federal deposi-
tory of criminal records. If Bill Bob had not been released to his
parents, he would have been transported by a Youth Services officer
to the intake office of the juvenile court, located at the juvenile de-
tention facility. If the arrest had been newsworthy, the local papers
would merely report that a juvenile had been taken into custody for
burglary, without identifying Bill Bob.
Under the merged system, Bill Bob would be taken from the
streets to Central Booking. There he would be photographed and
fingerprinted. He might immediately be placed in a cell, probably in
a cellblock reserved for youthful criminal offenders, or might be
taken to the Burglary Division for questioning, where an effort
might be made to clean up recent unsolved burglaries. Someone in
the police department might or might not attempt to contact Bill
Bob's parents: that would be a matter of local law enforcement pol-
icy, since the state law would no longer require it. Once Burglary is
through with him, Bill Bob would be returned to his cell to await his
first appearance in court. The next morning, his fingerprints and a
record of his arrest would be mailed to the central state depository
for criminal records and to the F.B.I. If newsworthy, the local paper
would fully report the arrest, including Bill Bob's name.
Before merger, Bill Bob, if not released to his parents by police,
would have been interviewed by a juvenile court intake worker, who
would have attempted to determine how serious the matter was.
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The worker would have examined, by computer or manually, the
available records to determine whether Bill Bob was already on ju-
venile probation and whether he had any prior referrals to the juve-
nile court. The worker would have attempted to contact Bill Bob's
parents. If they showed an interest in Bill Bob's release, chances are
he would be released to them, pending further court processing. If
Bill Bob had not been released by intake, he would have been
processed into the juvenile detention facility, where he would have
been enrolled in academic classes in an effort to prevent a major
interruption of his schooling. A detention hearing might shortly
have been held, at which Bill Bob would probably have been re-
leased if his parents were sufficiently interested in him to show up at
the hearing.
After merger, in some communities, Bill Bob would be called
from his cell to be interviewed by a personal recognizance program
worker in order to determine whether he would be a suitable candi-
date for release without security. In other communities, bail would
be set from an offense schedule and Bill Bob would remain in jail
until a bail bond could be purchased by his family or until a lawyer
was appointed (or was hired by the family) who could persuade a
judge to reduce bond to an amount the family could raise. Bill Bob
would be brought before a judge, probably the morning after his
arrest. There, he would be warned of his legal rights, informed of
the bond amount, and, perhaps, given the opportunity to apply for
the appointment of counsel if indigent. If unable to make bond, Bill
Bob would remain in the county jail, where he would watch
television.
Before merger, Bill Bob's case would have been evaluated by an
intake officer and, perhaps, by a prosecuting attorney. A decision
would have been made whether to handle the case informally or to
file a petition in juvenile court alleging the offense of burglary. The
case would likely have been handled informally unless Bill Bob had
an extensive record of prior referrals to the court. If a petition had
been filed, a date for an adjudication hearing would have been set
and Bill Bob, his lawyer, and his parents would be expected to be in
court for that hearing. If the evidence against Bill Bob was strong, it
would be expected that his attorney would have advised Bill Bob to
stipulate to the evidence in the expectation that such a step would
guarantee that the judge would give probation in the case.
In the merged system, the complaint filed by the police would
be forwarded to the prosecutor's officer for review of legal suffi-
ciency. In some jurisdictions, the case would in due course be
presented to a grand jury for an almost-certain indictment. In other
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jurisdictions, Bill Bob might receive a short probable cause hearing
in front of a magistrate before the prosecutor filed an information.
Before merger, all of the court proceedings in Bill Bob's case
would have been non-public, as would have been all of the court and
other legal papers filed in the case. After merger, all of the court
proceedings would be open to the public, although, unless the case
is extremely newsworthy, at most only a few courthouse regulars
might be expected to be present (unless Bill Bob is unfortunate
enough to be in court the day Miss Jones brings her eighth grade
civics class to observe justice in action). All of the papers in the case
that were filed with the clerk of court would also be open to public
inspection, although that is not much of a problem because finding
the file (even for a court proceeding) often presents some difficulty.
After merger, Bill Bob's lawyer would plea bargain with the
prosecutor, seeking a disposition that would permit his or her client
to remain on the streets. Whether this materialized would depend
mainly upon his prior record, all of which is open and available to
the prosecutor and the court. If the record is extensive, Bill Bob,
despite his youth, might receive a short prison sentence or perhaps
a form of "shock probation," which might even include elements of
the boot camp experience for youthful, male offenders.
Before merger, if Bill Bob had been committed to the state
training school system, he would have been evaluated and probably
assigned to a cottage or dormitory style living arrangement with
children approximately his own age and under the supervision of
house-parent types. He would have gone to school and perhaps re-
ceived some vocational training and maybe even some counseling.
After merger, if Bill Bob was sentenced to prison, he would be
transported to a large institution for youthful criminal offenders.
There he would work and might also receive some vocational train-
ing or academic schooling. Forget about counseling. He would live
with one or two other inmates approximately his age in a cell in a
cellblock under the control of a correctional officer who most defi-
nitely is not a house-parent type. If he became a chronic discipli-
nary problem in the youthful offender institution, he could be
transferred administratively to a less desirable facility.
Bill Bob would eventually be released on parole. Before
merger, the time as a "resident" would probably be one-third to
one-half the time after merger spent as an "inmate." Upon release,
before merger, Bill Bob would have a record as a delinquent,
although that record would not be public and would be relatively
inaccessible from computer terminals. After merger, Bill Bob would
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have a record as a criminal, and that record would be universally
available to any law enforcement officer in the nation with access to
a computer terminal and with Bill Bob's full name and date of birth.
Before merger, Bill Bob might be eligible to return to juvenile
court, after a respectable time following release from "aftercare," to
petition the juvenile court for a sealing or expunction of his juvenile
records. After merger, Bill Bob can forget about expunction. He
had best spend his time memorizing an explanation for the arrest
and subsequent events that he will be required to give for the rest of
his life no matter how straight he goes.
VI. ON BALANCE, DON'T ABOLISH IT
There are some very good arguments in favor of abolishing the
juvenile system by merging it into the criminal. There might be
some resource savings through efficiencies and some troublesome
frictional costs would be eliminated. The criminal system's inappro-
priate concept of a fresh start on crime would likely be eliminated or
greatly modified by merger.
These are all substantial gains. The losses would, however, be
even more substantial. We would lose control over status offenses.
While that is controversial, I wonder what a patrol officer is sup-
posed to do when he or she observes a fourteen year old walking the
streets at 3:00 a.m. if there is no justice system jurisdiction over run-
ning away from home. There are a number of communities that
have invested considerable thought and resources into dealing with
these status offenders. It is unlikely the legislatures would be willing
to make such conduct criminal, and it would be inappropriate to do
so. We would simply be withdrawing official authority over such
conduct. Of course, status offenses could be made a type of paren-
tal neglect and some of the slack taken up in that fashion.
Do we really want to deal with bailbondsmen in our juvenile
system? That would be a retrogressive step of giant proportions.
Finally, the undeniable fact is that children attract resources,
both public and private. That is why the juvenile system is compara-
tively better funded and staffed than the criminal system. The juve-
nile system has a level of resources that officials in the criminal
system can envy but not attain. Merger would have a leveling effect.
Unfortunately, it would likely be a downward leveling effect. Public
and private resources would flee from service to children in trouble
with the law because the legislature abandoned all pretense of help-
ing them by abolishing the legal system designed to deal only with
them.
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